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Many observers suggest that the "globalization" of the U.S. economy has changed the behavior of
inflation.  This essay examines this idea, focusing on several questions: (1) Has globalization reduced
the long-run level of inflation?  (2) Has it affected the structure of inflation dynamics, as captured
by the Phillips curve?  (3) Has it contributed substantial negative shocks to the inflation process?  The







     In recent years the United States has increased trade with
other countries, notably China and India.  Many observers suggest
that this “globalization” of the economy has changed the behavior
of inflation.  For example, Greenspan (2005) says that
globalization “would appear to be [an] essential element of any
paradigm capable of explaining the events of the past ten years,”
including low inflation.  The Economist (2005) says that
increased trade “makes a mockery of traditional economic models
of inflation, which generally ignore globalization.”
     A number of recent studies, including several from the Fed
system, seek to measure the effects of globalization. 
Conclusions vary, but there is a trend toward skepticism about 
effects on inflation.  Summaries of such effects typically
include phrases such as “modest” (Yellen, 2006) or “gradual and
limited” (Kohn, 2006).
     I applaud this trend and would like to see it accelerate. 
In my view, there is little reason to think that globalization
has influenced inflation significantly.  “Modest” and “limited”
probably overstate the effects.   
     This essay addresses several questions raised by economists
and policymakers:
    Has globalization reduced the long-run level of inflation?  
    Has it affected the structure of inflation dynamics, as2
summarized by the Phillips curve?  
    Has it contributed substantial negative shocks to the
inflation process?  
A short summary of the answers is no, no, and no.
     But first let’s ask a more basic question: has the U.S.
economy really been globalized?
1. What Globalization?
     Many discussions take it as given that globalization has
occurred.  But what does this term mean?  The most natural
definition is a rise in international trade.  By this definition,
nothing remarkable has happened to the United States in recent
years.
     Figure 1 shows a measure of trade from the IMF: non-oil
imports and exports as a share of GDP.  We see that trade has
indeed risen for the United States.  But this rise has been a
gradual process, one that started long before the changes in
inflation behavior attributed to globalization.
     U.S. trade has risen more quickly since 1990 than it did
during the 1980s.  But the greatest increases occurred in the
1970s –- a decade notable for the absence of disinflationary
forces.  
     Figure 1 also reminds us that, by world standards, the
United States is still a non-globalized economy.  U.S. trade is 3
far below the levels for open economies such as the United
Kingdom –- their levels today or 40 years ago.  If globalization
has reduced U.S. inflation, it should have wiped out U.K.
inflation before Margaret Thatcher had to worry about it.
     While U.S. trade has not changed remarkably in recent years,
the economy has globalized rapidly along another dimension:
financial integration.  Figure 2 shows an IMF measure of
“financial openness,” the ratio of foreign assets and liabilities
to GDP.  Since 1990 this variable has risen at an unprecedented
rate.
     This aspect of globalization is relevant to monetary policy
because it affects the behavior of interest rates and asset
prices.  However, financial integration does not directly
influence inflation.  To the extent there are coherent theories
of globalization and inflation, they involve effects of trade in
goods and services.  Trade hasn’t changed enough to produce big
effects.
2. Long-Run Inflation
     Since the 1980s, trade has increased somewhat for many
countries, including the United States.  Over the same period, 
inflation rates have generally fallen.  Some economists suggest a
link between these two phenomena, notably Rogoff at the 2003 and
2006 Jackson Hole conferences.4
     We all know that long-run inflation levels are determined by
central banks.  For some reason, central banks have produced less
inflation recently than they did in the 1970s and 80s.  In
analyzing why, many economists use the Barro-Gordon (1983) model
of monetary policy, in which inflation is the outcome of a
dynamic consistency problem.  Rogoff uses this model to analyze
the effects of globalization.
     A key parameter in the Barro-Gordon model is the slope of
the short-run Phillips curve.  This parameter helps determine the
severity of the dynamic consistency problem facing a central
bank.  Rogoff suggests that globalization makes the Phillips
curve steeper: inflation rises more for a given rise in output. 
The reason is that global competition makes wages and prices more
flexible.  A steeper Phillips curve makes expansionary policy
less tempting for the central bank, reducing equilibrium
inflation.
     As an interpretation of recent history, this story has a
fatal flaw.  A sizable literature has measured Phillips curve
slopes in the United States and elsewhere.  There is robust
evidence that these slopes have changed in recent decades -- but
in the wrong direction.  Throughout the industrial world,
Phillips curves have become flatter: a given rise in output has1 See for example IMF (2006) and the Fed research discussed by Yellen (2006) and Kohn
(2006).
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less effect on inflation.
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     Later I’ll discuss why the Phillips curve may have
flattened.  The point here is that this development contradicts
Rogoff’s story.  If the Phillips-curve slope really affected
inflation as predicted by the Barro-Gordon model, worldwide
inflation would have risen since 1980.      
3. Short-Run Dynamics
     Even if globalization doesn’t affect long-run inflation, it
could change short-run dynamics.  Applied economists typically
analyze short-run inflation behavior with a Phillips curve; a
simple version is 
      = (-1) + (Y-Y*) + ,
where  is inflation, (-1) is lagged inflation, Y is output, Y*
is potential output, and  captures shocks to the inflation
process.  Y-Y* is the “output gap.”
     Some people suggest that globalization has made the
traditional Phillips curve obsolete.  For example, President
Fisher of the Dallas Fed (2005) asks rhetorically
How can we calculate an “output gap” without knowing the present
capacity of, say, the Chinese and Indian economies?  How can we
fashion a Phillips curve without imputing the behavioral patterns
of foreign labor pools?  How can we formulate a regression
analysis to capture what competition from all these new sources
does to incentivize American management?6
     In my view, we can still measure output gaps and fashion
Phillips curves pretty well –- or at least, as well as we did
before the growth of trade with China and India.  There are
several stories about how trade has changed the Phillips curve,
but none withstands scrutiny.
     Foreign vs. Domestic Output Gaps 
     One idea suggested by Fisher is that a country’s inflation
depends on output in its trading partners, not its own output. 
This idea was proposed in a BIS study (Borio and Filardo, 2005),
which gained prominence with the help of The Economist.  The BIS
paper argues that foreign output matters because firms compete in
global markets.  It estimates Phillips curves with both foreign
and domestic output gaps, and reports that foreign gaps have
larger effects on inflation for the period 1985-2005. 
     This story is dubious on both theoretical and empirical
grounds.  In mainstream theories, output affects inflation
because it affects firms’ marginal costs.  Rises in marginal cost
are passed through into higher prices.  Marginal costs for a
country’s firms depend on their own output levels, not foreign
output.  
     Perhaps globalization makes markets more competitive,
reducing firms’ average markups.  However, average markups are
irrelevant to the cyclical behavior of inflation.  Higher
domestic output still raises marginal cost and hence prices.  For7
globalization to dampen this effect, it would have to somehow
cause countercyclical movements in markups.  I don’t see a reason
to expect this outcome.
     Empirically, the BIS results are not robust, as demonstrated
by recent work at the Board.  Ihrig et al. (2006) make reasonable
changes in the country weights used by the BIS to construct
foreign output gaps.  They also modify the BIS’s idiosyncratic
approach to modeling inflation expectations.  With either change
in specification, the effects of foreign gaps disappear for most
countries. 
     As a quick check on this issue, I estimated Phillips curves
with the data from Ihrig et al., which cover 14 industrial
countries.  For the period 1985-2005, I pooled annual data for
all the countries (294 total observations).  I regressed the
change in inflation on the domestic output gap, the foreign gap,
and both gaps.  Table 1 presents the results.
     When both output gaps are included in the Phillips curve,
the domestic gap is highly significant (t=5.1) and the foreign
gap is barely significant (t=2.1).  When the domestic gap is
included, adding the foreign gap raises the adjusted R
2 by only
0.01.  The results suggest that foreign gaps are at most a
secondary influence on inflation.
     The Slope of the Phillips Curve
     Perhaps the domestic output gap is still the key variable in8
the Phillips curve, but globalization has changed the coefficient
on this variable.  Such an effect is suggested by Rogoff and by
the IMF’s World Economic Outlook (2006).
     These sources disagree about the direction of the effect. 
As discussed earlier, Rogoff says that globalization increases
competition, which makes prices more flexible, which steepens the
Phillips curve.  The IMF says that globalization increases
competition, which makes it hard to raise prices, which flattens
the Phillips curve.
     While theoretically questionable, the IMF view has some
appeal because it fits the trends in the data.  Output
coefficients in the Phillips curve have fallen in recent decades
as trade has risen.  In its study, the IMF estimates the average
output coefficient for industrial countries was 0.27 in 1983 and 
0.17 in 2004.
     Is globalization the right explanation for flatter Phillips
curves?  Two other explanations are common.  First, lower trend
inflation has reduced the frequency of nominal price adjustment,
which flattens the Phillips curve in sticky-price models. 
Second, the rising credibility of central banks has anchored
inflation expectations, which dampens movements in actual
inflation.
     Both of these explanations are more appealing than the
globalization story.  Each is solid theoretically.  And the last9
two decades really have seen big changes in trend inflation, and
possibly in central bank credibility, while changes in trade have
been modest.
     To check the role of trade, I estimate a Phillips curve of
the form
      = (-1) + [0+1T](Y-Y*) + ,     
where T is the level of trade as measured by the IMF (see Figure
1).  This equation allows the output coefficient to depend on
trade.  The data cover the G7 for the period 1971-2005 (245 total
observations).
     The results suggest that trade has at most a small effect.
The point estimate of 1 is -0.008.  This means a trade increase
of 6% of GDP (the change in the U.S. from 1990 to 2005) reduces
the output coefficient in the Phillips curve by 0.05.  If the
coefficient is initially 0.5 (approximately the fitted value for
the average T), then US-style globalization reduces the
coefficient to 0.45.  The t-statistic for 1 is 1.6.  Probably
the results would be even weaker if we controlled for average
inflation and credibility.
     Potential Output
     A final parameter that globalization might affect is Y*.  As
Rogoff (2006) points out, globalization can improve the terms of
trade, which is equivalent to a rise in potential output.  This
effect means that higher economic growth is possible without10
raising inflation, at least temporarily.  
     I won’t dwell on this idea because it’s clear the effect is
minor.  Estimates of the gains from trade are small compared to
aggregate output (e.g. Kamin et al., 2004).  In the last decade,
U.S. productivity growth has been concentrated in industries that
use domestically-produced computers.  The 1970s remind me us that
rising trade may have little benefit for aggregate productivity. 
4. Import Prices and Inflation
     Even if globalization hasn’t changed the parameters of the
Phillips curve, it could affect the path of inflation.  Many
observers suggest that trade has produced negative shocks to U.S.
inflation –- negative values of the error  in the Phillips
curve.  These shocks are caused by declines in import prices
and/or increased imports of inexpensive goods.  
     Many economists presume that such an effect exists.  Rogoff
says that “obviously, since competition tends to drive down
prices, [globalization] should have some direct impact on
inflation.”  Kohn (2006) says “it seems natural to expect that
[trade with China and India] would have exerted some downward
pressure on inflation in the United States” (emphasis added).
     Real vs. Nominal Variables
     These statements may sound like common sense, but in fact
Rogoff and Kohn are expressing a fallacy.  Stephen Cecchetti has2 Cecchetti suggested this term in a conversation with me around 1987.
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called this fallacy the “accounting” theory of inflation.  In
this theory, one examines the determinants of individual prices,
such as trade, and then aggregates to find the effects on
inflation.
2
     The problem is that the prices affected by trade are
relative prices.  Imports of Chinese shirts make shirts cheaper
compared to other goods and services.  Inflation is the aggregate
change in nominal prices.  There is no “natural” or “obvious”
connection between inflation and relative prices, as any pattern
of relative-price changes is consistent with any inflation rate.
     One way to appreciate this point is to remember that, for
every relative-price decline, there is by definition a relative-
price increase.  Instead of focusing on declines in the relative
prices of imports, we could note the rising relative prices of
domestically-produced goods.  Should we worry that these price
changes put upward pressure on inflation?
     Confusion about nominal and real variables is rife in
analyses of inflation.  Milton Friedman (1975) pointed out this
problem in the context of oil shocks.  It arises whenever an
economist says that rising medical costs have raised inflation,
or that falling computer prices have reduced inflation (e.g.
Gordon, 2001).     
     Discussions of globalization often acknowledge that monetary12
factors determine inflation in the long run.  For example, Kohn
prefaces his objectionable comment with “although inflation is
ultimately a monetary phenomenon....”  My point is that basic
economics gives us no reason to expect any link between relative
prices and inflation, even in the short run.  The accounting
theory of inflation is always and everywhere a fallacy.
     Some Fallacious Calculations
     The accounting fallacy has distorted calculations of the
effects of globalization.  One example is a well-known study from
the Board: Kamin et al.’s (2004) analysis of trade with China. 
This paper starts with a sound theoretical model, in which
inflation is determined by the quantity equation for money.  But
the empirical work confuses nominal and relative prices.     
     Kamin et al. regress changes in nominal import prices on
measures of trade with China.  The regressions are cross-
sectional: each observation covers a sector of the economy for
the period 1993-2002.  Therefore, the results capture effects on
relative prices.  Note the results would be the same, except for
the constant term, if aggregate inflation were subtracted from
the dependent variable, making it explicitly a relative-price
change.
     Kamin et al. incorrectly interpret their coefficients as
effects on nominal prices.  They multiply the coefficients by
changes in trade levels over time to estimate the effects of3 IMF (2006) also presents cross-sectional regressions of price changes on measures of
trade.  This study hedges on the real-nominal distinction by calling the dependent variable
“relative price inflation.” 
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Chinese trade on aggregate import prices.  Then they multiply by
the import-GDP ratio to estimate the effect on inflation.
     Implicitly, the study assumes that the effect of trade on a
sector’s nominal price equals the effect on its relative price. 
Equivalently, a change in one sector’s trade has no effect on
nominal prices in other sectors.  This assumption is arbitrary.   
     Kamin et al. conclude that Chinese trade has had a small but
statistically significant effect on U.S. inflation.  Some
commentators suggest the effects might be larger if the data were
extended to the present, or trade with other countries were
accounted for.  In my view, however, the Kamin et al.
calculations should not be extended in these directions.
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     Is There Any Effect?
     Do relative prices ever influence inflation?  Historically
it seems they do in some circumstances, whether monetary
economists like it or not.  Friedman used the relative/nominal 
distinction to argue that OPEC shocks were not inflationary in
the 1970s.  Friedman was right in theory, but appears to have
been wrong in practice.
     Through what channels might relative prices affect
inflation?  We don’t know.  In a somewhat obscure paper, Ball and
Mankiw (1995) present one story.  In their theory, relative-price14
changes matter if they are unusually large.  The explanation
involves the interaction of relative shocks with stickiness in
nominal adjustment.  
     According to Ball and Mankiw, OPEC affected inflation
because it caused large year-to-year changes in relative prices. 
In contrast, inflation is not influenced by smooth trends in
prices, such as steady changes in medical or computer prices.
     Do import prices influence inflation?  Like other relative
prices, they matter only if they change sharply.  Big short-run
changes in import prices result mainly from changes in exchange
rates.  Rising trade with China and India is a smooth process
that shouldn’t affect inflation.
     Research is needed on how and why relative prices influence
inflation.  And this work must improve on current techniques for
estimating these effects.  Researchers often add changes in
relative food and energy prices to Phillips curves, and some 
include changes in relative import prices.  This approach assumes
that relative-price changes have linear effects on inflation,
which is wrong if only large changes matter.       
5. Conclusion
     Inflation behavior is and should be a perennial topic at
central banks.  However, it can get tedious to measure output
gaps and quibble over the structure of inflation lags.  It is15
natural to look for new ideas about inflation, such as effects of
globalization.
     But the leading stories don’t hold water.  Changes in import
prices may have some effect on inflation, but maybe not if they
reflect smooth changes in trade.  And there is little reason to
think that globalization has changed the structure of the
Phillips curve or the long-run level of inflation.
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Table 1
Foreign vs. Domestic Output Gaps
Dependent Variable: Change in Inflation
   Domestic Gap          Foreign Gap          Adj. R
2
      0.224                                    0.110
     (0.037)
                            0.286              0.046
                           (0.074)
      0.197                 0.157              0.120
     (0.039)               (0.075)